FBI：中国正在以前所未有的规模窃取美国经济：
-那是什么中国技术？ –
1 月 31 日
联邦调查局局长
克里斯托弗·雷
联邦调查局局长克里斯托弗·雷发表了主题演讲。
一场题为“应对中国政府在美国构成的威胁的对策”的讲座。
中国政府对美国的威胁：
中国政府在美国窃取尖端技术，威胁美国经济安全。
如何在中国窃取美国技术：
中国政府试图窃取美国最先进技术的具体方法是什么？它是
雷首先谈到了前苏联和中国的异同。
相似：
中国还否认基本自由、基本人权和民主规范。
不同之处：
目前，美国和中国的经济联系要多得多。
联邦调查局正在处理的事项：
在美国联邦调查局的案件中，有2000多起与中国政府窃取信息和技术有关。
《中国制造2025》：
中国政府已将其列入“中国制造2025”计划。
机器人，
绿色能源，
航天，
生物制药
10项技术是目标。
在这十项技术中，Ray 描述了与航空航天相关的技术盗窃案。
窃取 GE 航空机密信息：
去年 11 月，一位名叫徐彦军的中国情报官员试图窃取通用电气的机密航空信息。
徐元军
中国情报官员
在辛辛那提被定罪。
徐面临最高15年的监禁。它是
徐试图窃取通用电气与外国合资企业制造的先进发动机的信息。
China Cyber MSS（中国国家安全部）
被黑客访问
许
在 GE，我们在一家可以访问敏感数据和 IT 的公司中收购了一名员工。
“让 MSS（国家安全部）黑客窃取相同的数据，”他说。
中国间谍
通过领英
中国大学官员通过LinkedIn联系通用电气工程师，窃取通用电气的风扇叶片技术。
一名中国大学员工向一名美国工程师提供了“在中国的介绍和欧洲之行”。
FBI 和 GE 联合行动：
联邦调查局抓住了这一事实，假装“中国的计划执行得很好”。
我们让 GE 向工程师提供伪造文件，假设他们会被盗。
因此，可以防止盗窃。
中国政府黑客：
不仅窃取个人和公司信息
他还提到，他对美国所有行业进行了 10 年的恶意盗窃。它是
新小说
中国政府公司
一家名为 Shinovel 的中国国有企业
我从美国超导公司窃取了风力涡轮机控制的源代码。
因此，
美国超导的企业价值已经从 16 亿美元跌至 2 亿美元。
中国的网络盗窃问题：
雷说，网络盗窃问题仍在继续。
农业、医药和化工目标：
中国政府
软件公司的源代码和
制药公司测试数据和化学设计，
制造公司设计设计，
医院和信用卡公司，
银行个人信息等
据说它是黑客的目标。
中国政府的经济盗窃行动：
不仅史无前例
它对数十年的劳动力、想法和投资造成了很大的损害。
它正在颠覆美国的安全。
雅虎新闻
https://news.yahoo.co.jp/byline/iizukamakiko/20220207-00280941
Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Government Inside the U.S.
Threat to our Economic Vitality and Innovation
That’s what’s really at stake in the fight with the Chinese government here in America.
It’s home economics, not just macroeconomics.
America’s strength is built on our innovation,
When we tally up what we see in our investigations
—over 2,000 of which are focused on the Chinese government trying to steal our information and technology—
there is just no country that presents a broader threat to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic security than China.
The Chinese government steals staggering volumes of information and causes deep, job-destroying damage across a wide range of industries—
so much so that, as you heard, we’re constantly opening new cases to counter their intelligence operations, about every 12 hours or so.
What makes the Chinese government’s strategy so insidious
is the way it exploits multiple avenues at once, often in seemingly innocuous ways.
They identify key technologies to target.
Their “Made in China 2025” plan, for example, lists 10 broad ones
—the keys to economic success in the coming century—
spanning industries like robotics, green energy production and vehicles, aerospace, biopharma, and so on. And then—and then, they throw every tool in their arsenal at stealing that technology to succeed in those areas.
Here in the U.S., they unleash a massive, sophisticated hacking program that is bigger than those of every other major nation combined.
In just one case, one example,
a group of MSS-associated criminal hackers stole terabytes of data from hundreds of companies.Now, to put that in context, one terabyte is around 70 million pages of data.
Think about that.
They’re not just hacking on a huge scale but causing indiscriminate damage to get to what they want which compromised the networks of more than 10,000 American companies in a single campaign alone.At the same time,
the Chinese government uses intelligence officers to target the same information, multiplying their efforts by working extensively through scores of so-called co-optees.Basically, people who aren’t technically Chinese government officials but who assist in their intelligence operations—spotting and assessing sources, providing cover, communications, and helping steal secrets in other ways.
The Chinese government also makes investments and partnerships to position their proxies to take valuable technology.
Xu Yanjun and GE Aviation
A recent case from Ohio is a great illustration of the Chinese government’s multiprong strategy for stealing our valuable secrets.
This past November,
a Chinese intelligence officer named Xu Yanjun was convicted of economic espionage in Cincinnati.He was part of the Chinese Ministry of State Security,
which is one of their spy services, and he was in a unit responsible for stealing aviation-related secrets.Xu was targeting
an advanced engine made by GE and a foreign joint venture partner—an engine that Chinese state-owned enterprises were openly working to copy.He corrupted insiders with access to sensitive company data and access to company IT infrastructures,
so Xu could help MSS hackers, in cyber units back in China, target the same data at the same time.
Xu used one of his recruits,
or co-optees—this one a senior company IT official—to help him plant malware on a joint venture company laptop.He kept in touch with the MSS hackers in China to make sure that they could access the implant that he’d uploaded.
And then, to steal a particular composite fan blade technology that only GE possesses, he used another co-optee—this one an official at a prominent Chinese university—to contact a GE engineer through LinkedIn.
— FBI
Chinese Intelligence Officer Charged with Economic Espionage Involving Theft of Trade Secrets from Leading U.S. Aviation Companies | OPA | Department of Justice